Live signal index ·

Is the AI hype cooling down?

❄ Cooling Overheating 🔥

A composite reading of physical build-out and platform economics. Higher means the expansion is still intensifying; lower means the momentum is fading. Here's what goes into it.

See the breakdown

What the answer is built from

Five independent signals, each weighted by how directly it reflects real, committed demand. Each is scored from 0 (contracting) to 100 (surging).

The trajectory

Where the money and the megawatts are actually going.

Combined infrastructure spend, per quarter

Billions of dollars

Spend by operator

$B / quarter

New data-center power queued

Gigawatts / year

Total new power capacity queued

Gigawatts / year

Where data-center load is landing

GW in queue, top regions

The latest print

The charts above stop at the March quarter, but the June-quarter prints are now landing, and so far none of them points to a cooldown. Alphabet went first on Jul 22, with cloud revenue up 82% and quarterly capex roughly doubled. Microsoft and Meta both reported Jul 29: Microsoft's Azure crossed a $100B annual run-rate and grew 43%, on a record $678B of contracted backlog; Meta's revenue rose 28%, but its capex surge pushed operating margin down to 31% and free cash flow to just $784M, the clearest sign yet that the build is overtaking the cash. Amazon closed the set on Jul 30: AWS reaccelerated to 37%, its fastest growth since 2021, quarterly capex jumped 68% to $54.2B, and management raised full-year 2026 capex guidance to $220B, pinning the increase on the same memory-price surge the bottleneck section below tracks. Across the four, June-quarter capex alone topped $170B. And a fifth name now joins from an unexpected direction: SpaceX, freshly public after June's record $75B IPO, reports its first results as a listed company after the close on Aug 4. It is not a cloud operator, but it has made the boldest AI-infrastructure bet of all, proposing to move the data centers themselves into orbit.

Alphabet · Q2 2026 (quarter ended Jun 30) reported Jul 22, 2026 · figures from the earnings release

Total revenue

$119.8B

+24% vs last year

Google Cloud revenue

$24.8B

+82% vs last year

Cloud operating income

$8.8B

up from $2.8B a year ago

Capex, this quarter

$44.9B

~+100% vs last year

Operating income

$40.8B

+30% · 34% margin

2026 capex guidance

$195–205B

raised from $180–190B

One caveat on Alphabet's headline: reported net income leapt to $112.1B and diluted EPS to $9.11 (both up roughly 295%), but that is flattered by a one-time $99B unrealized gain on equity investments, booked below the operating line. Operating income ($40.8B, +30%) is the clean read. Source: Alphabet Q2 2026 earnings release (quarter ended Jun 30, 2026), reported Jul 22, 2026.

Microsoft · FQ4 FY2026 (quarter ended Jun 30) reported Jul 29, 2026 · figures from the earnings release

Total revenue

$90.0B

+18% vs last year

Intelligent Cloud revenue

$39.3B

+32% vs last year

Azure revenue growth

+43%

past $100B annual run-rate

Capex, this quarter

$41B

incl. finance leases

Commercial backlog (RPO)

$678B

+84% vs last year

Next-quarter capex guide

>$50B

still climbing

Azure crossing a $100B annual run-rate and the $678B backlog are the demand signals; the $41B of quarterly capex (cash for property and equipment $35.8B plus $5.6B of finance leases) is the spend. GAAP diluted EPS of $4.81 (+32%) includes a $3.2B gain from marking up Microsoft's Anthropic stake, worth about $0.33. Management guided FY2027 capex to roughly $175B and over $50B next quarter. Source: Microsoft FQ4 FY2026 earnings release (quarter ended Jun 30, 2026), reported Jul 29, 2026.

Meta · Q2 2026 (quarter ended Jun 30) reported Jul 29, 2026 · figures from the earnings release

Total revenue

$60.8B

+28% vs last year

Capex, this quarter

$31.1B

incl. finance-lease principal

2026 capex guidance

$130–145B

low end raised

Operating margin

31%

down from 43%

Free cash flow

$0.8B

down from $8.5B

Diluted EPS

$6.18

down 13% · missed

Meta is the sharpest illustration of this page's thesis: revenue still grew 28% to $60.8B, but a $31.1B quarterly capex bill cut operating income to $18.8B (31% margin, down from 43%), net income to $15.8B, and free cash flow to just $784M from $8.5B a year earlier. Shares fell about 7% after hours. Source: Meta Q2 2026 earnings release (quarter ended Jun 30, 2026), reported Jul 29, 2026.

Amazon · Q2 2026 (quarter ended Jun 30) reported Jul 30, 2026 · figures from the earnings release

Total revenue

$200.6B

+20% vs last year

AWS revenue

$42.2B

+37% · fastest since 2021

Capex, this quarter

$54.2B

+68% vs last year

Operating income

$27.5B

+43% · 14% margin

2026 capex guidance

~$220B

raised from ~$200B

Free cash flow (TTM)

−$7.6B

outflow as the build outpaces cash

Amazon's $62.6B net income and $5.75 diluted EPS are flattered by a $53.4B pre-tax gain on its Anthropic stake, booked below the operating line; operating income ($27.5B, +43%) is the clean read. The $54.2B of quarterly capex is purchases of property and equipment, and AWS growth of 37% ($42.2B) was its fastest since 2021. Andy Jassy raised full-year 2026 capex to about $220B, citing surging memory prices, and said even that will not meet the demand Amazon is seeing. Source: Amazon Q2 2026 earnings release (quarter ended Jun 30, 2026), reported Jul 30, 2026.

SpaceX · Q2 2026 · first report as a public company reports after the close Aug 4, 2026 · figures below are Q1 2026 actuals and disclosed targets

Revenue, Q1 2026

$4.7B

Starlink ~$3.3B of it

Loss from operations, Q1

−$1.9B

still lossmaking pre-scale

Adjusted EBITDA, Q1

$1.1B

Starlink segment $2.1B

IPO, Jun 2026

$75B

largest ever · ~$1.75T value

Orbital AI compute target

~1 GW

by late 2027 · AI1 satellites

Connectivity capex (FY28 est)

$20.8B

~5x FY25's $4.2B

SpaceX is the outlier here, on the page for one reason: it has made the most audacious AI-infrastructure bet of all. Rather than build the data centers on the ground, it proposes to launch them. The AI1 satellite Musk unveiled on Jun 8, 2026 carries a 150 kW compute payload with an interchangeable chip bay; SpaceX plans more than 1,000 a year from its Gigasat factory by late 2027, 30 to 50 per Starship launch, targeting roughly 1 GW of orbital AI compute a year, and has filed with the FCC for a constellation of up to a million satellites and as much as 100 GW. On the ground it is standing up a 10 GW solar plant in Bastrop, Texas and a roughly $55B "Terafab" chip fab. The financials are still those of a company only now stepping into the public eye: Q1 2026 revenue was $4.7B (Starlink about $3.3B of it) against a $1.9B operating loss, though the Starlink segment already turns a profit. June's IPO raised a record $75B at a valuation near $1.75T. SpaceX posts its first quarterly results as a public company after the close on Aug 4, 2026, so the Q2 figures are not out yet; the numbers above are Q1 2026 actuals from the IPO prospectus and disclosed targets. Sources: SpaceX Form S-1 / IPO prospectus (Q1 2026 financials), the AI1 disclosure (Jun 8, 2026), the FCC orbital data-center filing (Jan 30, 2026), and reporting from CNBC, Tom's Hardware and S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Funding the build-out

The spending is enormous, but is it being paid for out of pocket or on credit? The cash-flow statements answer that. Between them the five operators throw off about $649B of operating cash a year and are now plowing roughly three-quarters of it straight back into capex. The giants still generate tens of billions in free cash flow after they spend; but at the frontier the build has overtaken the cash, and Amazon and Oracle are now spending more than they earn, filling the gap from reserves and debt.

Operating cash flow vs capex from the cash-flow statements · toggle for the trend since 2020
capex covered by operating cash capex beyond operating cash (reserves / debt) 100% of operating cash flow

Snapshot view: trailing twelve months from the operators’ cash-flow statements. History view: annual fiscal-year figures combined across the five (2021–2025 from filings via stockanalysis.com, 2020 from company 10-Ks). Free cash flow here is simply operating cash flow minus purchases of property and equipment; companies’ own free-cash-flow measures differ (Amazon and others adjust for equipment finance leases, which also means all-in capex runs higher than the cash figure shown), and Amazon’s capex mixes AWS with retail logistics. Fiscal years are offset for Microsoft (ends June) and Oracle (ends May); snapshot periods end Mar 31, 2026 except Oracle (May 31, 2026). Illustrative, not investment advice. Sources: company 10-Q / 10-K cash-flow statements via stockanalysis.com (2020–2026).

The microscalers

The hyperscalers are not the only ones building. A second tier has grown up beneath them: specialist GPU clouds like CoreWeave, Nebius, Crusoe and Lambda that do essentially one thing, rent out Nvidia accelerators at scale. Call them microscalers, or neoclouds. They own no consumer platform and throw off almost no cash flow of their own, so they borrow against the chips themselves and pre-sell the capacity on multiyear contracts, then plow the proceeds straight back into more chips. Their capex curve is the steepest on this page, and their customer lists read like a directory of the AI labs, plus the hyperscalers who still cannot build fast enough on their own.

Neocloud capex and customers from filings, guidance and announced deals

Capex: the neoclouds and the converted miners

$B · 2023–2026 · dashed = estimated

CoreWeave alone still out-spends the entire rest of the field, and its curve is steeper than any single hyperscaler's early ramp. The converted miners (IREN, Applied Digital, Core Scientific, TeraWulf, Cipher) enter only in 2025, when their AI pivots began, and are drawn fully dashed because their numbers are total company capex that blends mining and AI, much of it customer financed, on fiscal years that do not line up with the calendar. IREN is the outlier: its 2026 spike is the roughly $5.8B of Microsoft GPUs plus further orders. Solid lines are CoreWeave and Nebius reported figures through 2025; every dashed point is guidance or an estimate. The private neoclouds (Crusoe, Lambda, Together) still do not disclose capex, so they are not plotted.

Who they build for

This is the part that ties the neoclouds back to the frontier. The capacity is not speculative: most of it is pre-sold to named AI labs and to the hyperscalers themselves, who rent burst compute from the neoclouds rather than wait on their own construction.

AI lab Hyperscaler Investor / enterprise

The converted miners

A whole cohort of former Bitcoin miners has worked out that its real asset was never the hashrate, it was the powered land: gigawatts of grid interconnection and cheap energy that now take years for anyone else to permit. Most of them do not build a cloud of their own; they lease that capacity to the neoclouds and hyperscalers, increasingly with Google or Nvidia backstopping the financing. It is the same chokepoint the "shells, land and interconnection" card further down tracks, seen from the supply side. IREN is the exception that went all the way and now runs its own GPU cloud.

Two names sit behind almost everything here: OpenAI on the demand side and Nvidia on the supply-and-financing side, the same loop the funding section flags, since Nvidia invests in the neoclouds that buy its chips to serve the labs it also backs. The converted miners add a second version of that loop, with Google and Nvidia backstopping the leases and taking equity in the very hosts they rent from. The conspicuous absence is Anthropic, which leans on Google TPUs and Amazon Trainium rather than renting neocloud GPUs, so this tier tilts heavily toward OpenAI and the open-model world.

Microscaler here means a specialist GPU cloud (also called a neocloud), distinct from the hyperscalers above. Capex: CoreWeave and Nebius from company filings and guidance (CoreWeave 2025 capex guided to about $20–23B); the 2026 points are guidance or estimates and are drawn dashed. Crusoe, Lambda and Together are private, so no capex line is shown for them; their entries reflect disclosed funding rounds and announced customer deals. Converted-miner figures are from company announcements: IREN's ~$9.7B Microsoft cloud deal (Nov 2025), Applied Digital's ~$11B CoreWeave leases at Ellendale, Core Scientific hosting CoreWeave after its holders rejected CoreWeave's buyout (Oct 2025), and the Google-backstopped Fluidstack leases at TeraWulf and Cipher. The converted miners' capex points on the chart above (2025 and 2026, dashed) are editorial estimates of total company capex, not reported AI-only figures, since these companies report on differing fiscal years and blend mining with AI spend; much of that spend is customer financed. Contract and backlog figures are the parties' announced numbers, are multi-year lifetime totals rather than annual, and can include options and later phases. Illustrative, not investment advice.

The picks and shovels

The hyperscalers get the headlines, but the chipmakers, memory houses and foundries behind them are in a capex super-cycle of their own, together laying out well over $130B a year to build the fabs, HBM lines and tools the AI build-out physically runs on. Trace that capital back through their filings and you can see exactly how the build-out got here.

The multi-year climb in chip capex

Annual capex, $B · 2019–2025

One line per filing trail (10-K / 20-F / 6-K). Memory (SK Hynix, Micron) shows the deep 2023 downturn cut and then the HBM-driven surge; TSMC keeps setting records; Intel is the one line bending down, pacing its foundry build to demand.

Where it stands now latest reported / guided annual capex, $B · hover any bar for detail

Annual capital expenditure compiled from company filings (10-K / 20-F / 6-K and quarterly reports); the latest point is FY2025 guidance, earlier points are reported actuals, converted to USD at period rates. Fiscal years and treatment differ (Micron’s ends in August; Intel’s figures are gross additions, before the partner offsets and CHIPS grants that lower net capex materially). “Samsung” is its semiconductor (DS) division. CXMT only began reporting publicly with its July 2026 Shanghai listing, so its bar is the 2026 equipment-procurement plan rather than an audited capex history, and it is absent from the 2019–2025 chart above for the same reason. Two kinds of company carry small capex by design and should not be read as small spenders: equipment makers, whose revenue is the mirror of everyone else’s capex, and fabless designers (AMD, Broadcom, Nvidia), who buy foundry capacity instead of building it, so R&D is the figure that matters and their volume lands on TSMC’s capex line. Illustrative, not investment advice. Sources: company filings & investor releases (2019–2025).

The sovereign money

It isn't only US hyperscalers writing the checks anymore. Governments and sovereign wealth funds now treat AI compute as strategic infrastructure, and have pledged hundreds of billions to build it, buy into it, or avoid being left behind. Here's who's committing what, and how each region's playbook differs.

Marquee commitments announced capital, $B · hover any bar for detail

Headline announcements, not deployed cash, a mix of state programs, sovereign wealth funds and public-private ventures, so they aren't strictly comparable (European figures overlap; * South Korea's cluster runs to 2047). Illustrative, not investment advice. Sources: government announcements, Global SWF, IEA and press reporting (2024–2026).

Where it could actually jam

Demand is only half the story. Even with the money flowing, the build-out slams into hard limits, from the accelerator itself (a market chokepoint as much as a physical one), through raw silicon and the machines that pattern it, packaging, passives, optics and the network fabric, out to water, power, the skilled trades who build it, and the export politics that can throttle any link overnight. Here's how binding each chokepoint becomes year by year through 2030, and the companies with the most leverage over it.

How binding easing tight severe binding · hover a year for detail · click any card for market share & a deep dive

Company names indicate supply-chain exposure to each bottleneck, illustrative, not investment advice. Trajectory synthesized from IEA, McKinsey, SemiAnalysis, TrendForce, Yole, SK Group and industry commentary (2024–2026).

What the bottlenecks paid

A thought experiment to close on. Take the flagship company behind each of the hardest chokepoints above, one name per bottleneck, put an equal amount of money into each a year ago and hold. Here is how that basket of picks-and-shovels would have done against the S&P 500 over the last twelve months.

Equal-weight basket · 1yr

+141%

7 bottleneck bellwethers, held 12 mo

S&P 500 · same window

+19.5%

the basket beat it by ~7×

Leader · Micron

+628%

the HBM / DRAM squeeze

Laggard · Nvidia

+11%

the one name below the S&P

Trailing 12-month price return the basket beat the S&P trailed it S&P 500 · hover any bar for detail

Hypothetical and illustrative, not investment advice. Equal-weight means an equal dollar amount in each of the seven names a year ago, held without rebalancing; figures are price return only (excluding dividends) over the 52 weeks to Jul 31, 2026. The average is pulled sharply upward by Micron's memory-shortage run: the median name returned about +68%, still well ahead of the S&P 500's +19.5% (the Nasdaq-100 returned about the same). The line worth staring at is at the bottom. Nvidia, the face of the whole trade, trailed the index, because over this particular year the binding constraint, and the money, moved downstream to memory, power and the tools. Which is the point of the section above: the bottleneck keeps moving. Source: 52-week price change per stockanalysis.com, as of Jul 31, 2026.